The ubiquitous yet inaccurate belief in international relations
scholarship that cognitive biases and emotion cause only mistakes
distorts the field's understanding of the relationship between
rationality and psychology in three ways. If psychology explains only
mistakes (or deviations from rationality), then (1) rationality must be
free of psychology; (2) psychological explanations require rational
baselines; and (3) psychology cannot explain accurate judgments. This
view of the relationship between rationality and psychology is coherent
and logical, but wrong. Although undermining one of these three beliefs
is sufficient to undermine the others, I address each belief—or
myth—in turn. The point is not that psychological models should
replace rational models, but that no single approach has a lock on
understanding rationality. In some important contexts (such as in
strategic choice) or when using certain concepts (such as trust,
identity, justice, or reputation), an explicitly psychological approach
to rationality may beat a rationalist one.I
thank Deborah Avant, James Caporaso, James Davis, Bryan Jones, Margaret
Levi, Peter Liberman, Lisa Martin, Susan Peterson, Jason Scheideman, Jack
Snyder, Michael Taylor, two anonymous reviewers, and especially Robert
Jervis and Elizabeth Kier for their thoughtful comments and critiques.
Jason Scheideman also helped with research assistance.